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Note

The True Story of What Happens

When the Big Kids Say, "It's my
football, and you'll either play by
my rules or you won't play at all."
Kapp v. National Football League,
390 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
I. INTRODUCTION
Professional football exists on all levels as a league sport.' The
importance of that simple statement is manifest. First, it means
that football is not a loose confederation of independent personnel
rosters, but an organization of interdependent units. Furthermore,
if a team is to continue in existence, it must remain competitive
with every other team in its league. As a result, if all or at least
the majority of teams in a league fail to maintain competitive equality, not only the lackluster teams, but the league as well, will probably face extinction. 2
1. Note generally in this regard that major league professional football
exists as the National Football League, the Canadian Football League,
and the World Football League. The following succinct statement ex-

presses the essential nature of the league concept of professional sport.
The product of professional sports is league sports, as differentiated from the periodic exhibition of sporting contests for
profit. No professional team sport can or does rest its long
term customer attractiveness upon the entertainment value of
any single exhibition, as a theatre enterprise or a boxing promotion might. Rather, the product of professional sports is
league sports, a concept which entails making every game of
some importance in terms of its impact upon the league race
for playoff spots, and ultimately upon the league championship.... Balanced competition is the necessary corollary of
the league sports framework.
Comment, Player Control Mechanisms in Professional Team Sports, 34
U. Prrr. L. REv. 645, 651 (1973).
2. The classic example of professional football league destruction as a result of monolithic capability was the demise of the All-American Con-

ference. There is little doubt that the complete dominance of that

league by the Cleveland Browns from the late 1940s to 1950 eliminated
the unique commodity of balanced competition from the league and

killed it as a result The Browns were in fact so competitively supe-

rior that in 1950, the same year in which they entered the NFL, they
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In an effort to maintain the competitive life-blood of professional
football, the leagues have established and enforced rules which restrict the method by which member teams shop for talent and
which direct how players, once selected, can change partners. This
note will examine the antitrust implications of imposing such restrictive rules, and secondarily it will study the applicability of the
antitrust laws to rules which have been endorsed through collective
bargaining. The rules to be examined are those of the National
Football League ("NFL"), and the vehicle for examining these rules
will be the questions raised in Kapp v. National Football League,3
wherein the court held that those rules were unreasonable restraints on trade.
II.

THE FACTS

While at the University of California, Joe Kapp displayed exceptional potential for a career in professional football. 4 After graduation, he was drafted by the Washington Redskins of the NFL pursuant to the "draft rule" found in sections 14.3A 5 and 14.56 of the
NFL Constitution and By-Laws. The primacy of the rights that
a team gains through the draft is kept unbesmirched by the socalled "tampering rule" contained in section 9.27 of the NFL Consti-

3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

captured the league crown by defeating the championship team. PRo,
Aug. 18, 1975, at 6B.
390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) [hereinafter cited in the text as
Kapp].
Kapp was selected as an All-American by several groups while a
quarterback for the Golden Bears of the University of California.
"At each Selection Meeting each club participating therein, shall select
players of its own choice; selection shall be made by the clubs in each
round in the reverse order of their standing." NFL CoNsT. & BY-LAws
§ 14.3(A) (1974).
"The selecting club shall have the exclusive right to negotiate for the
services of each player selected by it in the Selection Meeting. Selected players shall be placed on the Reserve List of that club." Id.
at § 14.5.
If a member club or any officer, shareholder, director,
partner, employee, agent or representative thereof, or any
person holding an interest in said club shall tamper, negotiate
with, or make an offer to a player on the Active, Reserve or
Selection List of another member club, then unless the offending club shall clearly prove to the Commissioner that
such action was unintentional, the offending club, in addition
to being subject to all other penalties provided in the Constitution and By-Laws shall lose its selection choice in the next
succeeding Selection Meeting in the same round in which the
affected player was originally selected in the Selection Meeting in which he was originally chosen. If such affected
player was never selected in any Selection Meeting, the Commissioner shall determine the round in which the offending
club shall lose its selection choice Additionally, if the Coin-
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tution and By-Laws. Washington, however, never made an offer
that was acceptable to Kapp. As a result, he opted for the cold
cash and colder climate of the Canadian Football League ("CFL").
Kapp played in the CFL for the seven years between 1959 and 1966.
During this time his professional potential became proven professional prowess.
While Kapp was under contract to the CFL, Washington retained
NFL rights to his services; therefore, no other NFL team could negotiate with him without first paying Washington for the right to
do so.8 At that time (1967), however, the NFL and CFL were not
the only professional football leagues. There was also the American Football League ("AFL") whose Houston Oilers franchise did
in fact negotiate with Kapp.
With the Oilers having greased the gears for Kapp's departure
from the tundra, his CFL relationship was understandably less than
stable. Kapp's CFL team had the option to renew his contract for
the 1967 season, exercised it, but then suspended him from playing
because of his unconcealed attempt to switch leagues.
Kapp's AFL contract with the Oilers was for $100,000 per year
for two years beginning with the 1967 or 1968 season depending
on whether or not the CFL exercised its option. In addition to his
basic compensation, he was to receive a $10,000 bonus for signing.
On April 12, 1967, for unknown reasons, the Kapp-Oiler contract
was declared invalid by a joint pronouncement of NFL Commissioner, Pete Rozelle, and the AFL Commissioner.9
Kapp finally ended up playing the 1967 football season, not in
Houston, but in sunny Bloomington, Minnesota, a result which cost
the Vikings $50,000 for Kapp's CFL release, and presumably some
payment to Washington as well. Kapp signed a two year contract
missioner decided such offense was intentional, the Commissioner shall have the power to fine the offending club and
may award the offended club 50% of the amount of the fine
imposed by the Commissioner. In all such cases the offended
club must first certify to the Commissioner that such an offense has been committed.
Id. at § 9.2.
8. See note 5 supra.
9. Kapp alleged that the invalidation of his Oilers contract was done pursuant to an understanding between the NFL and CFL that players
shall not be allowed to contract to jump leagues during the time they
are already under contract. See 390 F. Supp. at 76.
If indeed this allegation is true and such an understanding does exist (no attempt was made in the case to ascertain the truth of the allegation), it raises serious questions of conspiracy to maintain a monopoly under section 2 of the Sherman Act. That question, however, will
not be dealt with in this note.
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with Minnesota covering the 1967 and 1968 seasons for $300,000. He
played during those two years and then again in 1969, when Minnesota exercised its option, and Kapp vaulted the Vikes to the 1969
Super Bowl.
Thereafter, the Vikings offered Kapp another two year contract
at the same rate of compensation, but he refused to sign. Although
other NFL teams approached him, 10 none of them followed up with
offers." Finally, the New England Patriots sought Kapp. They
ascertained from Minnesota what the Vikings would require to release him, and then entered into a transfer agreement with Minne12
sota.

Under these conditions, Kapp entered into a contract with New
England on October 6, 1970 to play out the remainder of the 1970
season and the 1971 and 1972 seasons. The total compensation package was $600,000.13 Kapp did in fact play the remaining eleven
10. Purportedly both the Philadelphia Eagles and the Houston Oilers
(then a member of the NFL because of the NFL-AFL merger) expressed interest in Kapp. Id.
11. Kapp alleged (and experience and common sense tend to back him
up) that the reason neither team made an offer was because of the
price they feared they would have to pay to get Kapp released under
the "Rozelle Rule."
Any player, whose contract with a League club has expired,
shall thereupon become a free agent and shall no longer be
considered a member of the team of that club following the
expiration date of such contract. Whenever a player, becoming a free agent in such manner, thereafter signed a contract
with a different club in the League, then, unless mutually
satisfactory arrangements have been concluded between the
two League clubs, the Commissioner may name and then
award to the former club one or more players, from the Active, Reserve, or Selection List (including future selection
choices) of the acquiring club as the Commissioner in his sole
discretion deems fair and equitable: any such decision by the
Commissioner shall be final and conclusive.
NFL CONST. & BY-LAws § 12.1 (H) (1974).

12. Minnesota in its agreement with New England got a two-for-one bargain. Kapp's playing rights were released in an arrangement whereby
Minnesota was to get New England's number one draft selection of
1967 and its purple ribbon selection rights in the 1972 draft in exchange for New England's getting Kapp. It must be remembered that
agreements like this maintain balance in the league. The truth of this
contention is nowhere clearer than in an example such as this wherein
a then perennial door-mat gives up two players with tremendous potential for super-stardom to a team which is so incapable of vigorous
competition that it could only prove itself to be the league's second
best team in the previous year.
13. The term "contract" is used advisedly in this instance as the NFL
showed some evidence that the document under which Kapp played
eleven games in 1970 was merely an interim agreement to become
fully effective only upon Kapp's signing of a Standard Player Contract. See 390 F. Supp. at 77.
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games of the 1970 season for New England, for which he was paid
$154,000. In January, 1971, the Patriots, pursuant to sections 15.114
and 15.415 of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws, sent Kapp a
Standard Player Contract 16 which he refused to sign since he was
14.

All contracts between clubs and players shall be executed

in triplicate and be in the form adopted by the member clubs
of the League; such contract shall be known as the "Standard
Players Contract". Subject to the provisions of Section 9.1
(C)(8) hereof, a club may delete portions of or otherwise
amend the Standard Players Contract subject to the right of
the Commissioner to disapprove the same, as provided by
Section 15.4 hereof.
NFL CONST. & BY-LAws § 15.1 (1974).
15.
The Commissioner shall have the power to disapprove any
contract between a player and a club executed in violation of
or contrary to the Constitution and By-Laws of the League,
or if either contracting party is or has been guilty of conduct
detrimental to the League or to professional football. Any
such disapproval of a player contract must be exercised by
the Commissioner within ten (10) days after such contract is
filed with the Commissioner.
Id. § 15.4.
16. The Standard Player Contract is pertinent to this note because of two
paragraphs included in it: Paragraph 4, which binds the player to
the NFL and club constitutions, by-laws, rules, and regulations,
The Player agrees at all times to comply with and be
bound by: the Constitution and By-Laws, Rules and Regulations of the League, of the Club, and the decisions of the Commissioner of the League (hereinafter called "Commissioner"),
which shall be final, conclusive and unappealable. The enumerated Constitution, By-Laws, Rules and Regulations are intended to include the present Constitution, By-Laws, Rules
and Regulations as well as all amendments thereto, all of
which are by reference incorporated herein. If the Player
fails to comply with said Constitution, By-Laws, Rules and
Regulations, the Club shall have the right to terminate this
contract as provided in Paragraph 6 hereof or to take such
other action as may be specified in said Constitution, ByLaws, Rules and Regulations, or as may be directed by the
Commissioner. The Player agrees to submit himself to the
discipline of the League and of the Club, for any violation of
said Constitution, By-Laws, Rules and Regulations, subject,
however, to the right to a hearing by the Commissioner. All
matters in dispute between the Player and the Club shall be
referred to the Commissioner and his decision shall be accepted as final, complete, conclusive, binding and unappealable, by the Player and by the Club. The Player, if involved
or affected in any manner whatsoever by a decision of the
Commissioner, whether the decision results from a dispute between the Player and the Club or otherwise, hereby releases
and discharges the Commissioner, the League, each Club in
the League, each Director, Officer, Stockholder, Owner or
Partner of any Club in the League, each employee, agent, official or representative of the League or of any Club in the
League, jointly and severally, individually and in their official
capacities, of and from any and all claims, demands, damages,
suits, actions and causes of action whatsoever, in law or in
equity, arising out of or in connection with any decision of the
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under the assumption that he already had a valid contract. On May
28, 1971, NFL Commissioner Rozelle reminded the Patriots that according to sections 17.5B' 7 and 15.618 of the NFL Constitution and
By-Laws, no player may play for a member club unless he has on
file with the commissioner an executed Standard Player Contract.
In July, 1971, the other NFL clubs complained of Kapp's being
allowed to practice even though he had not signed a Standard
Player Contract. As a result, Rozelle reiterated that Kapp must
sign a Standard Player Contract as a condition precedent to being
eligible to participate in NFL activity. Kapp reacted by leaving
football and turning to America's second favorite pastime-litigation.
III.
A.

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

Scope and Nature of the Problem
Kapp's attack on the restrictive rules of professional sport, alleg-

Commissioner, except to the extent of awards made by the
Commissioner to the Player. The Player hereby acknowledges that he has read the present said Constitution, By-Laws,
Rules and Regulations, and that he understands their meaning.
and Paragraph 10, which contains the so-called "option clause."
The Club may, by sending notice in writing to the Player,
on or before the first day of May following the football season
referred to in f 1 hereof, renew this contract for a further
term of one (1) year on the same terms as are provided by
this contract, except that (1) the Club may fix the rate of
compensation to be paid by the Club to the Player during said
further term, which rate of compensation shall not be less
than ninety percent (90%) of the sum set forth in 3 hereof
and shall be payable in installments during the football season in such further term as provided in %3; and (2) after
such renewal this contract shall not include a further option
to the Club to renew the contract. The phrase "rate of compensation" as above used shall not include bonus payments or
payments of any nature whatsoever and shall be limited to
the precise sum set forth in 1 3 hereof.
No player may practice with a club unless such player is
17.
signed to a contract with that club for the current or succeeding season or seasons. All contracts including contracts of
players on the Future List must be filed with the Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of Section 15.3
hereof.
NFL CONST. &BY-LAws at § 17.5 (B).
No club shall permit a player in any practice session or
18.
game, subject to the tryout provisions of Sections 12.4(A) &
(B), with its team unless:
(a) A Standard Player Contract has been executed between the player and a club or the Player Contract has been
properly assigned to the club, and
(b) Such contract or assignment is on file in the League
Office or the League Office has been notified by telegram or
TWX of the execution of a contract or assignment.
Id. at § 15.6.
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ing that they violate sections 119 and 220 of the Sherman Act, was
not novel. 21 Basically, he claimed that the "draft rule," 22 the "tam19.

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal: Provided, That nothing contained in sections 1 to 7
of this title shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity which
bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trademark, brand or name of the producer or distributor of such
commodity and which is in free and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced or distributed
by others, when contracts or agreements of that description
are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any
statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such
resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for such resale, and the making of such contracts or
agreements shall not be an unfair method of competition
under section 45 of this title: Provided further, That the preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance of
minimum resale prices on any commodity herein involved,
between manufacturers, or between producers, or between
wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in
competition with each other. Every person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1 to 7 of this title to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars,
or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973).
20.
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof shall be
punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id. § 2.
21. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Radovich v. National
Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. International
Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236 (1955); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966); Washington State
Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.
1966); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260
(N.D. Ga. 1973); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Cheevers,
348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972); Philadelphia World Hockey Club,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049
(C.D. Cal. 1971); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, TRADE REG.
REP. (1970 Trade Cas.)
73,282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Molinas v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v.
National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
22. See note 5 supra.
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pering rule,' '2 3 the "option clause,' '2 4 the "Rozelle rule,"2 5 and the
"Standard Player Contract rule ' 26 are foisted upon players through
a combination of the NFL member clubs, whereby they boycott any
and all players who refuse to agree to these restrictive rules. It
was Kapp's contention that as a result of such a group boycott the
Sherman Act was violated. Since the decision in Kapp was rendered on a motion for summary judgment alleging that the group
boycott was a violation of the Sherman Act, the threshold question
was whether professional football is subject to the antitrust laws.
This question was easily answered by reference to Radovich v. National Football League,27 a case which is the basic ingredient in an
antitrust challenge of professional football's rules of restraint.
In Radovich, the petitioner, a former all-pro guard for the NFL
Detroit Lions, broke his player contract with the Lions so that he
could play for the Los Angeles Dons of the All-American Conference. His justification for doing so was that the Lions had refused
to transfer him to the Los Angeles NFL team so that he could be
with his sick father in California. Two years after leaving the
Lions, Radovich was offered the position of player-coach of the San
Francisco Clippers of the Pacific Coast League. The NFL, however,
informed the Clippers that Radovich was black-listed from professional football in the United States and that any team that gave
him a job would suffer severe penalties. As if by some quirk of
Thomas Hardian coincidence, the Clippers never gave Radovich the
position they had offered him. In answering the question of
whether football, like baseball,2 8 was immune from antitrust liability, the Court said: "[T]he volume of interstate business involved
in organized professional football places it within the provisions of

the [Sherman Act] .29

Having answered the easy question (i.e., that football is subject
to the antitrust laws), the court in Kapp next faced the more difficult issue-Are the restrictive rules complained of by Kapp illegal
per se under the Sherman Act, or are they subject to the analysis
of the rule of reason?
A literal reading of section 1 of the Sherman Act 30 leaves little
question that any and all contracts, combinations, and conspiracies
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See note 7 supra.
See note 16 supra.
See note 11 supra.
See notes 14, 15, 17 & 18 supra.
352 U.S. 445 (1957) [hereinafter cited in the text as Radovich].
See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
352 U.S. at 452.
See note 19 supra.
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in restraint of trade are in violation thereof. A flat rule application
has not, however, been followed. The Supreme Court in a landmark antitrust decision stated:
[The Sherman Act] evidenced the intent not to restrain the right
to make and enforce contracts, whether resulting from combinations or otherwise, which did not unduly restrain interstate or
foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained by methods ... 3which
would constitute an interference1
that is an undue restraint.

This enunciation coupled with the following:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined
by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
To bind, to restrain is of their very essence. The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. 32

amount to a standard for determining whether a particular practice
is an illegal restraint of trade, a standard commonly referred to as
the "rule of reason." The rule of reason knows no real bounds,
rather it requires a case-by-case analysis of the economics peculiar
to the particular industry involved, and a determination of whether
the restraint is narrow enough in its application so that it does not
unduly restrict competition.
The "per se" rules were conceived to eliminate the painstaking
and time-consuming task of applying the rule of reason, 33 and are
the natural offspring of a time-poor parent like the Supreme Court.
Per se rule applicability in its most pristine sense means that the
type of activity alleged fo have occurred, if proven, is conclusively
presumed to be an unreasonable restraint of trade. This conclusion,
therefore, follows without any consideration of the purposes for the
restraint in the context of a particular industry's economics.3 4
31. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911)
(emphasis added).
32. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
33. The so-called per se rules exist in many areas of antitrust litigation.
They are applied to those types of restraint which are so anti-competitive by nature that no purpose can justify them. The result of
the application of these per se rules is, of course, that the practices
to which they are applied are unquestioned violations of the antitrust
laws. The following practices have been declared per se violations
of the Sherman Act: territorial allocations of markets in United States
v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); tying arrangements
in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); group
boycotts in Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941); and price fixing in United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
34. There are basically two rationales for this short-circuiting of antitrust
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The court in Kapp concluded that the determination of whether
the Sherman Act was violated by the NFL's restrictive rules should
be made by rule of reason analysis. However, the court's articulated reasons for concluding this were unsatisfactory 5 because they
failed to deal with the similarity between the facts of the case before it and the facts of those cases in which the Supreme Court had
applied the per se rule. Instead, the court in Kapp treated the application of per se reasoning as elective and concluded that since
it would reach the same result applying either test it did not make
a difference as to which test were used. In fact, it makes a world
of difference which rule applies. If the restrictions are per se violative no alteration except eradication can make the restriction legal.
If the rule of reason applies, loosening of the rules between law
suits may save the rule in some form.
B.

Classic Boycott Per Se Analysis

Group boycotts, the situation allegedly present in Kapp, are generally considered to be per se unreasonable restraints of trade, and,
therefore, violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act.36 A brief look
at the "classic" per se group boycott cases makes it clear, however,
that the per se rule is inapplicable to the NFL situation. As will
be seen, the latter situation is not one in which a group of competitors organizes to exclude another from competition, but rather one
where a group at one level of competition agrees to rules of selfregulation which affect the entrance of others into another level
of competition.
analysis known as per se rules; one is positive the other negative.
On the positive end of the spectrum is an idealistic Justice Black
who stated:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). On the
negative side is a realistic Justice Marshall who in United States v.
Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972), said the Court
would just as soon not "ramble through the wilds of economic theory
in order to maintain a flexible approach."
35. The court said in this regard:
[W] e conclude that in this particularfield of sports league activities the purposes of the antitrust laws can be just as well
served (if not better served) by the basic antitrust reasonableness test as by the absolute per se test sometimes applied
by the courts in other fields.
390 F. Supp. at 82 (emphasis added).

36. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941).

ANTITRUST
In Fashion Originators'Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC,37 the petitioner, an association of original dress design manufacturers who
sold their designs throughout the United States, established a practice to eliminate from competition those who copied and sold their
designs. The original action involved an order by the FTC demanding that FOGA cease and desist in its "unfair method of competition" known as black-listing. The Supreme Court case was brought
by FOGA to appeal the circuit court's decree to affirm the FTC
order.
Since the guild members' originals were neither protected nor
protectable by copyright or design patent, the "style pirates" had
no legal difficulties in copying the creations of the guild members.
The pirates had no cost of creation to recover and could undersell
the members of the guild. As a result of what seemed to be justifiable outrage toward an unfair method of competition, the guild
members sought redress of their grievances.
Their efforts resulted in a system whereby all the guild members
refused to sell to any retailer who was blacklisted as a result of
having bought and sold "copies." The system was enforced by imposing heavy fines on all members of the guild who were caught
selling to such retailers. Periodic audits of the guild members'
books were made to discover sales to blacklisted retailers.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the guild members admitted
that a boycott existed and that its purpose was to eliminate the pirates as competitors. They argued, however, that the boycott was
reasonable because of the effect that the pirates had on the original
fashions business.38 The Supreme Court chose not to consider the
reasonableness of the guild's goals stating: "[T]he reasonableness
of the methods pursued by the combination to accomplish its unlawful object is no more material than would be the reasonableness of
the prices fixed by unlawful combination."3 9
FOGA was closely followed by Associated Press v. United
States.40 In AP,the Government challenged both the method by
which membership in the association was granted and how the association dealt with the news it collected. The group boycott in this
case resulted from the member papers' refusal to sell news to nonmembers prior to publication. The Court found the boycott to be
a violation of the Sherman Act despite the association's contention
37. 312 U.S. 457 (1941) [hereinafter cited in the text as FOGA].
38. See 312 U.S. at 458-60. These pages contain FOGA's arguments in
summary form as to the reasonableness of their boycott.
39. Id. at 468.
40. 326 U.S. 1 (1945) [hereinafter cited in the text as AP].
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that the members' dissemination of news to non-members was not
indispensible to the continued existence of non-members' papers
(i.e., the Court found the boycott to be a per se Sherman Act violation and, thus, did not consider petitioner's arguments of reasonableness).
In another case, Kior's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.4 1 the

Supreme Court made it clear for the first time that group boycotts
are illegal per se under the Sherman Act regardless of whether only
one small competitor is run out of the market or whether there is
(as in FOGA and AP) a public injury because of the sizeable share
of the product market held by the boycotting party. In Klor's,
Broadway-Hale (one of Kor's direct competitors in the retail sale
of appliances in the San Francisco market area) entered into an
agreement with major appliance manufacturers whereby Klor's
could only buy their products at discriminatory prices, if at all. As
a result of these agreements, Broadway-Hale was totally eliminated
as a direct competitor. Broadway-Hale argued that the boycott was
not unreasonable in that its scope was limited to private and not
public injury. The Supreme Court, however, replied to that in the
following way:
We think Kor's allegations clearly show one type of trade
restraint and public harm the Sherman Act forbids ....
Group boycotts or concerted refusals by traders to deal with
other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category.
They have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable
in the specific circumstances ....
Plainly the allegations of this complaint disclose such a boycott ....
It clearly has by its "nature" and "character" a "monopolistic tendency." As such it is not to be tolerated merely because
the victim is just one merchant whose business is so
small that
42
his destruction makes little difference to the economy.

C. Middle Ground: Professional Football Lands on the "Free Parking" of Antitrust
FOGA, AP, and Klor's differ in one major respect from the NFL
situation-the boycott declared in each of them had as its purpose
or necessary end the injury to or elimination of competition. The
restrictive rules of the NFL have as their purpose not the elimination, but the maintenance of competition between the League's
teams. As stated earlier,48 professional football exists as a league
sport and the league exists only if intra-team competition is bal41. 359 U.S. 207 (1959) [hereinafter cited in the text as Kor's].
42. Id. at 210-13.
43. See note 2 supra.
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anced; therefore, the restraints imposed by the NFL rules, even
though they are for an economic purpose, are not for an anticompetitive purpose. The "classic" per se analysis is inappropriate and in44
applicable to the restrictive rules of the NFL.

Two more recent Supreme Court cases add credence and validity
to the foregoing analysis of the inapplicability of per se rules to
non-commercial situations in general and to professional football in
particular. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co 5
involved a factual situation in which sellers of gas burners needed
to meet the standards of the American Gas Association before any
gas distributor would supply gas for the burner. Plaintiff, having
failed to get the necessary American Gas Association approval, was
unable to market its burners because people found little use for a
gas burner for which they could not get gas. The Supreme Court
held that the boycott by all the gas distributors would be a per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act if, and only if, the district
court on remand could find that the plaintiff's direct competitors
had assisted in formulating the standards by which plaintiff's burners were rejected as being inadequate. The Court stated in essence
that a per se application could not be used unless it were shown
that foreclosing a market to one possible entrant was done by a
combination of or (as in this case) a conspiracy
with a possible di46
rect competitor of the potential entrant.
The second of the validating cases, and probably the more important one, is Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.4 7 In Silver,
the plaintiff, in an effort to achieve "instantaneous communications
with firms in the mainstream of the securities business,"48 sought
direct private telephone connections with members of the New York
Stock Exchange ("Exchange"). Such connections were and are extremely important to non-Exchange members such as was Silver.
44. Note is taken of Professor Coons' excellent article with respect

45.
46.

47.
48.

to the general concept of commercial and non-commercial group boycotts and the inapplicability of the per se rules to the latter. Coons,
Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv.
705 (1962). The application and extension of this concept to professional sports is discussed in PlayerControl Mechanisms, supra note 1.
364 U.S. 656 (1961) [hereinafter cited in the text as Radiant Burners].
See also Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261
F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore. 1966), for a factual situation similar to that in
Radiant Burners but with a broader basis for the decision. In that
case, a plywood trade association was allowed to adopt standards
which foreclosed the plaintiff from the market even though some of
the members of the trade association were plaintiff's direct competitors.
373 U.S. 341 (1963) [hereinafter cited in the text as Silver].
Id. at 343.
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Exchange rules adopted pursuant to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 called for approval by the Exchange of any member's
grant of private telephone connections to any non-member. The
Exchange granted "temporary approval" of Silver's connections,
but in a matter of months and without prior notice, it decided to
disapprove the connections. Silver alleged that this refusal was a
conspiratorial group boycott by the Exchange and its member firms
in competition with him and that such a group boycott was a per
se violation of the Sherman Act.
Citing Klor's,49 the Supreme Court declared that such a group
boycott would normally be per se violative of the Sherman Act;
however, it then went on to state the following: "Hence, absent
any justification derived from the policy of another statute or otherwise, the Exchange acted in violation of the Sherman Act." 50 In
Silver, because of the existence of the statutory scheme of the federal securities laws, the imposition of a restraint by the Exchange
was not a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The Court concluded (and elaborated in a footnote by Justice Goldberg 51 ) that
before a self-regulated industry can impose rules which could deprive an individual of his livelihood, notice and hearing are requisite. Thus, in Silver, since there was neither notice nor hearing,
the Court found the rule to be a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.
The applicability of the Silver analysis to professional sports is
52
demonstrated by Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.
Haywood involved the National Basketball Association's ("NBA")
49. See note 41 supra.
50. 373 U.S. 341, 363 (1963).

51. See 373 U.S. at 364 n.16, wherein Justice Goldberg posited the following:
It may be assumed that the Securities and Exchange Commission would have had the power, under § 19 (b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b), pp. 352-353, 357 & note 7, supra, to direct the Exchange to adopt a general rule providing
a hearing and attendant procedures to nonmembers. However, any rule that might be adopted by the Commission
would, to be consonant with the antitrust laws, have to provide as a minimum the procedural safeguards which those
laws make imperative in cases like this. Absent Commission
adoption of a rule requiring fair procedure, and in light of
both the utility of such a rule as an antitrust matter and its
compatibility with securities-regulation principles, see p. 361,
supra, no incompatibility with the Commission's power inheres in announcement by an antitrust court of the rule. Compare Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental
Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 723-724.
52. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) [hereinafter cited in the text as

Haywood]. See also Comment, Antitrust Law: Procedural Safeguard
Requirements in Concerted Refusals to Deal: An Application to Professional Sports, 10 SAw Dimo L. REv. 413 (1973).
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four-year college rule.53 This rule prohibited NBA member teams
from drafting any player until his high school graduating class
would have been graduated from college regardless of whether the
athlete in question ever spent a day in a college classroom.
Spencer Haywood challenged this rule. In 1970, he had signed
a player contract with the Denver Rockets of the American Basketball Association for a large amount of money. It soon became obvious, however, that Denver would not be able to compensate Haywood in full.54 Late that same year, he signed a contract to play
for the Seattle franchise of the NBA. However, NBA Commis53. The NBA four-year college rule is found in sections 2.05 and 6.03 of
the NBA By-Laws:
A person who has not completed high school or who has completed high school but has not entered college, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until four years after he
has been graduated or four years after his original high school
class has been graduated, as the case may be, nor may the future services of any such person be negotiated or contracted
for, or otherwise reserved. Similarly, a person who has entered college but is no longer enrolled, shall not be eligible to
be drafted or to be a Player until the time when he would
have first become eligible had he remained enrolled in college.
Any negotiations or agreements with any such person during
such periods shall be null and void and shall confer no rights
whatsoever; nor shall a Member violating the provisions of
this paragraph be permitted to acquire the rights to the services of such person at any time thereafter."

NAT'L BASKETBALL Assoc. BY-LAws § 2.05.

The following classes of persons shall be eligible for the annual draft:
a) Students in four year colleges whose classes are to be
graduated during the June following the holding of the
draft;
b) Students in four year colleges whose original classes
have already been graduated, and who do not choose
to exercise remaining collegiate basketball eligibility;
c) Students in four year colleges whose original classes
have already been graduated if such students have no
reihiaining collegiate basketball eligibility;
d) Persons who become eligible pursuant to the provisions
Id. § 6.03. of Section 2.05 of the By-laws."
54. As explained in BocK & OLAw, BAsIrxrALL STAnS OF 1974, 23 (1973),
Rockets' owner Bill Ringsly sought to head off Haywood's defection
to the NBA by offering him $1.9 million over six years. The contract's
small print, however, revealed that of the total sum only about 20
per cent would ever be paid in salary over the term of the agreement.
The remainder was to accrue from a long term annuity in which Denver invested $100,000. Further, Haywood's lawyer, Al Ross, projected
that the total value of the annuity would be less than the publicized
amount of the contract-about $1 million less. Finally, none of the
income from the annuity was guaranteed and none of it was payable
if Haywood was traded or if Denver or the ABA folded.
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sioner Walter Kennedy foreclosed Haywood's entry into the NBA
by invoking the four-year college rule since Haywood's high school
class had yet to be graduated from college. Haywood then brought
suit contending that this rule was the basis for a group boycott
which was illegal per se under the Sherman Act. The district court
defined the four-year college rule not in terms of a restraint by direct competitors on another competitor, but as a restriction imposed
by "one level of a trade pattern" on a person "at another level." 55
In other words, the district court took notice that in professional
basketball (as in professional football) the boycotts involve group
refusal to deal with players who do not fit or follow the restrictive
rules and are not commercial boycotts imposed by competitors to
destroy competition.5 6 Having recognized the problem, the district
court turned to Silver for guidance.
The Haywood court analyzed Silver as an exception to the boycott per se doctrine. 57 It determined that Silver in distillate form
presented a three-pronged test: 58 (1) the industry involved must be
one which is directed by statute to regulate itself, or one whose
structure necessitates self-regulation; (2) the goal of the group imposing the rule must be one that can be achieved in no other way
than the imposition of reasonable restraint; (3) the rule, if it has
the effect of foreclosing entry to the industry, must give the person
being foreclosed notice and hearing. If the rule which results in
a group boycott meets these three tests, the rule of reason rather
than the per se rule will be applied to determine if there is an antitrust violation. In Haywood, the failure of the NBA to offer or
provide for notice or hearing prior to excluding a player under the
four-year college rule was fatal.
The Silver-Haywood approach is a-desirable and highly acceptable middle ground for analyzing the Kapp-NFL situation and for
determining the validity of professional league sports rules in general. Under the Haywood formulation of the Silver rule, Kapp can
55. 325 F. Supp. at 1061.
56. Id. at 1064. This type of non-commercial boycott is readily distin-

guishable from FOGA, AP, and Klor's, the cases in which the Supreme
Court has deemed the per se boycott rule appropriate. An investigation of the inapplicability of traditional boycott per se application to
non-commercial situations can be found in Coons, supra note 44.
57. The author questions whether Silver is in a strict sense an exception
to the classic boycott per se rule. It is suggested that the Silver rule
is a special test applicable to self-regulated industries where standards
and rules are established by an association of industry members to
maintain the economic integrity of the industry, but that it is only
applicable in those situations in which competitors are not those responsible for establishing the rules which restrict entry.
58. 325 F. Supp. at 1064-65.
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be analyzed in the following manner. First, the industry structure
of professional football, like that of basketball, is one which necessitates self-regulation. 59 Second, the goal of the restrictive rules
is the perpetuation of balanced competition and thereby the continuation of the league. Since most would agree that without the restraints the rich teams would buy all the good players and destroy
competition, not only is the goal of league survival reasonable, but
the method (by way of restraint) seems necessary.10 Finally, in
Kapp's case the facts indicate that he was given notice that he
would not be eligible to play in the NFL if he did not sign a Standard Player Contract.6 1 Whether he was given a chance to be heard
on the issue is unmentioned, unknown, and unprovided for in any
of the NFL documents involved. Considering the circumstances, it
is doubtful that any hearing was provided Kapp. Without knowing
this positively, however, it was improper for the court to dismiss
summarily whether the various rules involved in the case could
reach the level where their validity, in the antitrust sense, could
be measured by the rule of reason. Since Kapp may fit the SilverHaywood mould, a discussion of the reasonableness of the questioned rules is in order.
D. Rewriting the Rules to Result in Reasonableness under the Rule
of Reason
To comprehend fully the restrictive scope of the NFL rules out
of which the Kapp complaint grew, it is necessary to view their in59. Those commentators who have written on the subject of self-regulated
industries and the application of the antitrust laws to them would necessarily define self-regulated industries so as to include professional
sport. See, e.g., Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial
Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 Dux L.J. 247 (1970).
60. Articles expressing the opinion that restraints are necessary because
without them the poor teams would die of talent attrition include
Comment, supra note 1, Comment, The Sherman Act: Football's
Player Controls-Are They Reasonable?, 6 CALiF. W.L. Rlv. 133 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Football's Player Controls]; Note, The Super
Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HAiv. L. REv. 418 (1967) [hereinafter cited as The
Super Bowl and the Sherman Act].
The author takes issue with the assumption that the wealthy teams
would buy all the league talent. Either that assumption or the assumption that the rules exist to maintain league balance is erroneous.
If it is true that balanced competition is necessary to the continuation
of the league, and if it is true that the wealthy teams would buy all
the league talent if they are unrestrained, it can only be concluded
that the wealthy owners desire to hang themselves by their money
belts because not only the poor teams, but all league teams, die with
the demise of the league by way of competitive imbalance.
61. 390 F. Supp. at 77.
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terrelationship. The primary complaint involved the group boycott
by the NFL member clubs of any player who refused to sign a
Standard Player Contract. This boycott is enforced by sections 15.1
and 15.462 of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws. The mandatory
signing of the Standard Player Contract has two basic goals. First,
it binds the signer to the existing constitution, by-laws, rules and
regulations of the NFL and the member club as well as to any future amendments. 63 Second, it binds the player to the option clause
which allows the member team which has contracted with the
player to retain his services for one year beyond the contract term
at a rate of compensation not less than 90 per cent of .the player's
last salary. 64
There is further interrelation in that by binding himself to the
NFL Constitution and By-Laws, the player acquiesces to the Rozelle
Rule which is contained in them. 5 The Rozelle Rule in turn melds
with the option clause because it further extends the length of time
the player will stay with a club and inhibits movement because it
requires the acquiring team to compensate the team losing the
player in either money or men.
Taken as a whole, this system which forces a player to sign a
Standard Player Contract if he wants to play completely eliminates
all player choice on where he will play. His only choice is whether
he will play. Beside this restraint in movement, the player has almost no say in what compensation he will receive. 66 This results
because although the player can contract with another club after
he has played out his option, he may do so only after the team with
which he contracts compensates the losing team. Thus, even
though another team may be willing to pay the player an amount
in excess of anything his original team has offered him, the new
team may not be able to pay that salary plus compensation to acquire the player's rights under the Rozelle Rule.
The draft rule 7 and the tampering rule 68 present the same problems in the context of restraints on professional rookies. Indeed,
the restraints are even more extreme in this context. Under the
draft system, college athletes are chosen by the member teams with
the team having the worst won-loss record from the previous year
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See notes 14 & 15 supra.
See note 16 supra.
Id.
See note 11 supra.
This statement is meant to cover only the intra-NFL situation, because
at least in the case of super-stars, the "other" leagues are in bidding
competition with the NFL.
67. See notes 5 & 6 supra.
68. See note 7 supra.
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being accorded first choice in each of the draft's seventeen rounds.
Upon his selection by a team, the player can negotiate only with
that team since the tampering rule causes any team that negotiates
with a player on another team's selection list to lose a selection
of its own and become subject to heavy penalties. Thus, a player
chosen in the draft by a club has no choice but to sign with that
club or not play NFL football.
Of course, when and if the player does sign a contract with the
selecting club, he is then subject to all the rules previously discussed. Even if the player does not sign with the NFL selecting
club, if he wishes to contract with an NFL club in the future, that
club will have to compensate the selecting club if it has retained
the player on its reserve roster. 69
This discussion of the NFL rules and the restraint created by
their interrelationship demonstrates that the rules are unreasonable
even in the context of their goal-to maintain a high level of intraleague competition. The court in Kapp concluded the same thing
as to all the rules except the option clause,70 and, therefore, partially granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment.
The author would briefly like to suggest the following changes
in the presently unreasonable rules so as to make the rules reasonable and to restrict player selection and movement in a manner that
would maintain a high level of intra-league competitioh.7
As to the draft rule, two changes are appropriate. First, the
draft should last for only a limited number of rounds, five instead
of the present seventeen. By making this change, all the "cream"
of graduating football players would get even league distribution, and at the same time a large number of free agents (players
not bound to any team) could be approached by as many teams as
have need for the free agents' services. Using this approach, the
clubs could fill weak spots in their rosters and negotiate salary on
the basis of need, while the free agent could decide where he would
play on the basis of compensation, likelihood of first year playing
exposure, and location.
69. See notes 5 & 6 supra.
70. The court said with regard to the option clause that:
[s]ince NFL rules leave the matters of duration and salary to
free negotiation between players and clubs, this lone prescribed option provision [the option clause] cannot be said to
so extend the original term and salary as to render it patently
unreasonable; its legality cannot, therefore, be determined on
summary judgment.
390 F. Supp. at 82.
71. Certain of these suggestions found their formative stages upon reading
Football's Player Controls and The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act,
supra note 60.
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The second change concerns those who are in fact drafted. If
they cannot come to terms with the selecting club, they should be
thrown back into the ranks of the eligible after a period of six
months. At this time, a "second draft" would take place.7 2 If, after
the "second draft," a player were still unable to come to terms with
his selecting club, he should become a free agent after a period of
two months following the date of the second draft. The tampering
rule should stay in effect during those periods in which the selected
player is technically negotiating with his selecting club. This system subjects both the player and club to pressures which create
an incentive to reach an agreement (i.e., the player will miss part
of the season and the club will lose a person with high potential),
yet the player still has choice in where he will play.
As to the option clause, it should become a bargained for term
of the player's contract and not just boiler-plate. In this way, each
team could decide from the outset of the negotiations if a player
has adequate talent or potential to justify payment of extra money
to him for an extra year, and the player could decide if the amount
of money offered were worth the potential restriction on movement
represented by the option clause. It should be pointed out, of
course, that in addition to the decision of whether to pay or accept
more money, an important consideration in bargaining for an option
clause is the leverage it creates in new contract negotiation. If the
team to which a player is under contract can exercise an option and
employ him at 90 per cent of his former salary, would not the player
be tempted to accept a new contract at a higher salary (or even
the same) rather than play for less?
As a final change in the NFL rules, the Rozelle Rule must be
altered, yet its purpose (i.e., to discourage wholesale team-hopping)
is so necessary that creating a rule that is less restrictive but just
as useful is a task of mammoth proportion. First, the player should
be able to bargain for a paragraph in his contract that gives him
the right to buy his freedom after the last year of the contract (or
after the option year if the contract has an option clause) at a price
to be negotiated by the parties prior to contracting. In no case
should the price be more than the total compensation paid for the
last year's services. Such a paragraph, if bargained for, would alleviate the necessity for any intervention by the Commissioner of the
NFL. Further, the cap on the price of freedom will fluctuate according to the player's ability; therefore, the losing team gets more
for what it loses.
72. Professional baseball has used a similar system for years. See
FESSIONAL BASEBALL RuLEs, Rule 4 (d) (1969).

PiO-
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Another solution, of course, is necessary for those who do not
bargain for a "freedom buy-out" clause as outlined above. The following system or a variant of it should work. The Standard Player
Contract should provide for a mandatory new contract negotiation
period to last for six weeks beginning after the last game of the
last contract, or the option, year. If the player and team are unable
to reach a mutually acceptable agreement in that time, the player
should become a free agent capable of contracting with any member club but not for more than one year at a time and not for an
amount less than the final offer of the losing club. If another club
does not opt to hire the player for a more substantial sum, the
player can, of course, return to his original club where he will receive the best terms offered him during negotiations.
If another club chooses to employ the player, the losing club will
get the right to select a new player in a special draft round to coincide with the regular "first draft" already outlined. The special
draft round will take place between the third and fourth rounds
of the "first draft" and losing teams will choose in order of the salaries paid to the player or players they lost, with high salary getting
first choice. As in the freedom buy-out clause situation, this system
allows player movement and maintenance of competitive balance,
while providing the player and team an incentive to negotiate and
reach an acceptable agreement.
IV. LABOR LAW ANALYSIS
A. Background
The antitrust analysis of the Kapp case may have been superceded by a labor law approach to the problem. In Kapp, the NFL
raised as a defense to Kapp's complaint that since all the rules
which he complained of were made part of a collective bargaining
agreement, they were exempt from the antitrust laws regardless of
73
whether or not they violated the laws.
74
The court held that the facts did not present such a defense.
15.47'
The reason for so holding was that although sections 15.1 and
of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws which required players to
sign the Standard Player Contract were accepted by the player's
association and were included in the Collective Bargaining Contract
dated June 17, 1971, the illegal group boycott took place on May
73. 390 F. Supp. at 84.
74. The court went on to add that there may be limits on the extent to
which labor and management can agree within the forbidden regions
of the antitrust laws. Id. at 86.
75. See notes 14 & 15 supra.
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28, 1971. Thus, the aegis of labor law had yet to be lifted when
the league boycotted Kapp.7 6 As to Kapp, and indeed all players
not under a collective bargaining agreement (as is currently the
case for all NFL players), this holding is of some solace. However,
the bigger question remains-can an individual member of a professional sports team challenge the league rules as violations of the
are a bargained for part of the collecantitrust laws when the rules
77
tive bargaining agreement?
B. Where Antitrust Law Fits in the Labor Law Scheme of Things
The concept of exclusive representation in collective bargaining
is one of the backbones of American labor policy.7 8 It means that
the employees in the bargaining unit lose their right to bargain
with their employer individually whether they are members of the
certified bargaining agent (union) or not. In the NFL, the players
(the bargaining unit) are represented by the National Football
League Player's Association ("NFLPA"), the certified bargaining
agent. Thus, the NFLPA, and only that group, can bargain with
the NFL club owners in the areas of mandatory bargaining (i.e.,
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment) under section 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act.7 9

In the trade-off

76. The league contended that the terms of the Collective Bargaining Contract were retroactive to February 1, 1970. The court held, however,
that since Kapp was never told he must sign a Standard Player Contract because of the existence of a collective bargaining agreement,
the league could not say that the retroactivity of the contract justified
Kapp's ouster.
77. This note does not attempt to cover the ramifications of the situation
in which the challenged rules are not in actuality bargained for, but
are "thrust upon" the players [a term used by Justice Marshall in his
opinion in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 295 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ]. For a case involving such an issue in professional sports,
see Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964):
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances
to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long
as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been
given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
79. Id.
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for collective strength, therefore, the players give up their right to
bargain individually except to the extent they are given that right
under the collective bargaining agreement. The resolution of
whether an individual member of a collective bargaining unit can
challenge the results of certified collective bargaining is impliedly
answered in the negative by this quote from J.L Ose v. NTLR: 10
The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position more
than that of the group, to vote against representation; but the
majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain,
individual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in
as a contribution to the collective result. We cannot except individual contracts generally from the operation of collective ones
because some may be more individually advantageous.
J.I. Case involved a situation in which the petitioner refused to
bargain with the union, giving as his reason that pre-existing contracts between himself and individual employees would necessarily
be breached if a collective bargaining agreement were negotiated.
The Court, in light of this particular fact situation, was asked to
determine whether a collective bargaining agreement superceded
the individual contracts. Using the language previously quoted, it
held that a collective bargaining agreement did in fact have priority
over individual contracts. The implication as to professional football is that since the February 1, 1970 collective bargaining between
the NFLPA and the member clubs specifically included a provision
that all players shall sign a Standard Player Contract, 8 ' all the
rules which were discussed in section III of this note as being violative of the Sherman Act are, therefore, subjects of a collective bar80. 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944). It should be noted that the decision in J.1.
Case forms the basis of the opinion expressed in one article that labor
law and not antitrust law will determine the continued existence of
restrictive rules in professional sports. Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust
Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in
Peonage,81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).
81. Article III § 1 of the CoLLEcmvs BARGAnING AGREmmNT BETWE THE
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS AssocTION AND THE AIEmy ER
CL BS OF

=H NATIONAL FOoTBALL ImAGuE (February 1, 1970)

states

that:

All players in the NFL shall sign the Standard Player
Contract which shall be known as the "NFL Standard Player
Contract." The Standard Player Contract shall govern the re-

lationship between the clubs and the players, except that this
Agreement shall govern if any terms of the Standard Player

Contract conflict with the terms of this Agreement. No
amendments to the Standard Player Contract affecting the
terms and conditions of employment of NFL players shall be
effected without the approval of the NFLPA, subject, however, to the right of the player and his club to agree upon
changes in his contract consistent with this Agreement.
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82
gaining agreement. As a result, it may be implied from J.1 Case
that players (members of the bargaining unit) have no standing to
sue if they find the terms of the contract unacceptable.
The question looms large, however, as to whether the antitrust
laws are of such paramount importance to the economic stability
of the nation that members of a bargaining unit can challenge terms
of their union's collective bargaining agreement as being violative
of those laws. Except for the answer derived by implication from
J.1. Case, the question is unanswered. The Supreme Court, in its
decisions concerning the interplay of antitrust and labor law, has
never intimated that an individual member of the bargaining unit
has standing to make such challenges.
Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3 Electrical Workers, 3 and United
Mine Workers v. Pennington 4 are almost unanimously cited in favor of the proposition that a member of the collective bargaining
unit can challenge the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
as being violative of the antitrust laws, and Local 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.8 5 is cited to the contrary.,
However, as will be shown, none of these cases support either of the
positions.
Allen-Bradley involved a union that had managed to organize
a majority of New York's electrical workers. Both employees of
electrical manufacturers and contractors were represented by the
union. The collective bargaining agreement provided that manufacturers would sell only to contractors with whom the union had
contracts and that the contractors would buy only from those manufacturers with union contracts. Those manufacturers who did not
have contracts with the unions and were, therefore, foreclosed
from competing in the New York electrical supply market, sued the
union for violating the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held that
such agreements were not insulated from the antitrust laws simply
because a union was involved: "a business monopoly is no less such
[a monopoly] because a union participates, and such participation
' 87
is a violation of the [Sherman] Act.

82. See, e.g., Jacobs & Winter, supra note 81; Note, Flood in the Land
of Antitrust: Another Look at Professional Athletics, the Antitrust
Laws and the Labor Law Exemption, 7 IND. L. REv. 541 (1974).
83. 325 U.S. 797 (1945 [hereinafter cited in the text as Allen-Bradley].
84. 381 U.S. 657 (1965) [hereinafter cited in the text as Pennington].
85. 381 U.S.. 676 (1965) [hereinafter cited in the text as Jewel Tea].
86. For some scholarly review of the problems of Allen-Bradley, Pennington, and Jewel Tea, see Di Cola, Labor Antitrust: Pennington, Jewel
Tea and Subsequent Meandering,33 U. PiTT. L. REv. 705 (1972); Note,
Labor-Antitrust: Collective Bargainingand the Competitive Economy,
20 STAN. L. REv. 684 (1968).
87, 325 US. at 811,
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In Pennington,the Supreme Court again held that union activity
could be found violative of the antitrust laws. The case was concerned with a collective bargaining agreement entered into between
the United Mine Workers and the larger mine companies whereby
market overproduction was to end by eliminating the smaller mine
companies. The elimination of the small company competition was
to be achieved by making the smaller companies meet the high scale
of pay agreed to by the union and the large companies. Since the
smaller companies could not pay such high wages, they would be
ruined. They challenged the original agreement as violative of
the Sherman Act,8 8 and the Supreme Court held on appeal that
'tone group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors
from the industry and the union is liable with the employers if it
becomes party to the conspiracy."8 9
Finally, in Jewel Tea, a case decided the same day as Pennington, the plaintiff meat cutters union had entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with several employers of meat cutters. Included in the terms was a provision that market operating hours
would be from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday through Saturday.
The agreement further provided that no customer could enter the
market except during those hours. Jewel Tea was one of the
signer-employers, though a reluctant one. After signing the contract, it sued the union alleging that the agreement violated the
Sherman Act by restricting the use of their facilities in an unreasonable manner since the Jewel Tea stores were set up to operate
without a butcher and, therefore, could be open for business in excess of the stipulated periods. The Supreme Court held that the
provision in question was within the mandatory subjects of bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act, i.e. hours. Therefore,
the agreement was protected by national labor policy which exempts labor and the results of collective bargaining from the antitrust laws.90
88. The United Mine Workers brought the primary suit for the collection

of royalty payments due from one small company. The payments
were to go to the miners' retirement fund.
89. 381 U.S. at 665-66.
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1973):
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall
be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor,
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust
laws.
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The cases are clearly not supportive of the proposition that employees can or cannot bring suits alleging that a term or terms of
the collective bargaining agreement under which they are bound
is violative of the antitrust laws. Allen-Bradley and Pennington
were suits by companies who were foreclosed from their respective
markets because of union conspiracy with their competitors, and
Jewel Tea was a suit by an employer who bargained with a union
and did not like his bargain. There being no better authority, J.I.
Case at least suggests the solution to this knotty issue: NFL players
who are subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
which has been reached by freely negotiated give-and-take cannot
bring suits questioning the validity of the terms of the agreement.
This is because the bargained for agreement is reached by the collective power of the unit, and to allow a dissatisfied segment of the
whole to question the result reached through the collectivity of
power would impair the equality of employer-employee bargaining
power which national labor policy seeks to establish and protect.
V.

CONCLUSION

The following suggestions to both the NFL and the players incorporate the ideas expressed in this article.
A.

Suggestions for the NFL

1. The rules and regulations of the NFL should provide in each
instance a procedure for notice and hearing to any person aggrieved
by them. This is especially important for those rules which by
their nature preclude players or potential players from employment
in the NFL. Such a rule would include the one requiring players
to sign standard player contracts.
2. The Rozelle Rule, the option clause, and the draft rule should
be substantially rewritten so as to be less restrictive on a player's
power of choice. This is essential because even if the professional
football industry should fall into the self-regulated industry rules
of Silver and Haywood, and even though the efforts made in (1)
supra were to insure that this does occur, the fact remains that even
after professional football qualifies for Silver rule treatment its
rules will be scrutinized under the rule of reason.
3. There should be an attempt to reach agreement with the
NFLPA as soon as possible. This is advantageous to the league as
it will insulate them from player antitrust litigation under the theory of J.I. Case.
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B. Suggestion for the Players
There is only one suggestion for the players-do not enter into
a collective bargaining agreement until: the NFL offers to eliminate or alter substantially the rules held violative of the Sherman
Act in Kapp; or the courts have conclusively decided whether the
rules complained of in Kapp are indeed violative of the antitrust
laws. If the players enter into a new collective bargaining agreement prior to either of these events occurring they will lose all
chance to free themselves of the unreasonably restrictive rules of
professional football.
Keith A. Prettyman '76

